An Economic View of the Market for Corporate Control
An Economic View of the Market for Corporate Control
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In our eReader you can find the full English version of the book. Read An Economic View of the Market for Corporate Control Online - link to read the book on full screen. Our eReader also allows you to upload and read Pdf, Txt, ePub and fb2 books. In the Mini eReder on the page below you can quickly view all pages of the book - Read Book An Economic View of the Market for Corporate Control
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The stock prices of unsuccessful merger targets seem to revert to their pre-offer level by the time failure of the offer becomes known. The stock prices of unsuccessful tender offer targets exhibit a different pattern. The stock prices of unsuccessful targets rise in -11- response to the announcement and remain substantially above their pre-offer level after the failure of the offer is announced. However, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) report that the stock prices of unsuccessful target firms t...hat do not receive subsequent takeover offers in the next two years revert to their pre-offer level. In contrast, the targets that receive subsequent offers realize a further increase of about 28% in their stock price. This evidence suggests that the stock prices of unsuccessful tender offer targets remain above their pre-offer level in anticipation of a future takeover bid, and that an eventual takeover is required to realize the stock price increases associated with the announcement of a tender offer.
What to read after An Economic View of the Market for Corporate Control?
You can find similar books in the "Read Also" column, or choose other free books by Richard S Ruback to read onlineMoreLess
To quickly assess the difficulty of the text, read a short excerpt:
The stock prices of unsuccessful merger targets seem to revert to their pre-offer level by the time failure of the offer becomes known. The stock prices of unsuccessful tender offer targets exhibit a different pattern. The stock prices of unsuccessful targets rise in -11- response to the announcement and remain substantially above their pre-offer level after the failure of the offer is announced. However, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) report that the stock prices of unsuccessful target firms t...hat do not receive subsequent takeover offers in the next two years revert to their pre-offer level. In contrast, the targets that receive subsequent offers realize a further increase of about 28% in their stock price. This evidence suggests that the stock prices of unsuccessful tender offer targets remain above their pre-offer level in anticipation of a future takeover bid, and that an eventual takeover is required to realize the stock price increases associated with the announcement of a tender offer.
What to read after An Economic View of the Market for Corporate Control?
You can find similar books in the "Read Also" column, or choose other free books by Richard S Ruback to read onlineMoreLess
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