Coalition Cryptography And Stability Mechanisms for Coalition Formation in Ta

Cover Coalition Cryptography And Stability Mechanisms for Coalition Formation in Ta
Coalition Cryptography And Stability Mechanisms for Coalition Formation in Ta
Gilad Zlotkin
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, ^i ^ N:Q < Pi will be called concave if for all finite sets of tasks X C r, Z CT, we have c{Y U Z) - c{Y) < c{X U Z) - c{X). All concave TODs are also subadditive. It turns out that general subadditive Task Ori- ented Domains can be restricted, becoming concave Task Oriented Domains. For example, the Postmen Domain is subadditive, when the graphs over which agents travel can assume any topology. By restricting legal topologies to trees, the Postmen Domain becomes concave. Definition 8 A coalition game with transferable utility in normal characteristic form {N, v) is convex if for any coalitions 5, V, v(S) + viV) < v(S U V) 4- v{S D V). In convex coalition games, the incentive for an agent to join a coalition grows as the coalition grows. Theorem 4 Any encounter (Ti, . . . , T^) in a concave TOD induces a convex coalition game {N, v). Theorem 5 [Shapley (1971)] [13]: In convex coalition games, the Shapley Value always satisfies the criterion of coalition rationality. In concave TODs, the Shapley-based mechanism introduced above is fully stable, i.

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