Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
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In our eReader you can find the full English version of the book. Read Collusion in Hierarchical Agency Online - link to read the book on full screen. Our eReader also allows you to upload and read Pdf, Txt, ePub and fb2 books. In the Mini eReder on the page below you can quickly view all pages of the book - Read Book Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
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The mechanism can be described sequentially as follows: the principal observes the output produced by the manager and gives him the corresponding transfer. If output is high, there is no further action. If output is low the principal requires the report of the auditor. If the auditor reports a 'high' signal the manager is punished with P™.
In the first region, with low accuracy and small punishments, only informational rents are decreased while effort levels for each type of manager remain unch...anged. This is 25 analogous to the Baron-Besanko's separation result which stated that the output decision is made independently of the auditing decision (although the auditing decision is not made independently of the output decision). In other words, the effort exerted by each type of manager in the optimal contract with auditing is the same one he exerted in the optimal contract without auditing. As the accuracy of the auditor's signal or the maximum punishment increases, the rent of the high type manager decreases but the effort of the low type manager is not adjusted.
What to read after Collusion in Hierarchical Agency?
You can find similar books in the "Read Also" column, or choose other free books by Fred Kofman to read onlineMoreLess
To quickly assess the difficulty of the text, read a short excerpt:
The mechanism can be described sequentially as follows: the principal observes the output produced by the manager and gives him the corresponding transfer. If output is high, there is no further action. If output is low the principal requires the report of the auditor. If the auditor reports a 'high' signal the manager is punished with P™.
In the first region, with low accuracy and small punishments, only informational rents are decreased while effort levels for each type of manager remain unch...anged. This is 25 analogous to the Baron-Besanko's separation result which stated that the output decision is made independently of the auditing decision (although the auditing decision is not made independently of the output decision). In other words, the effort exerted by each type of manager in the optimal contract with auditing is the same one he exerted in the optimal contract without auditing. As the accuracy of the auditor's signal or the maximum punishment increases, the rent of the high type manager decreases but the effort of the low type manager is not adjusted.
What to read after Collusion in Hierarchical Agency?
You can find similar books in the "Read Also" column, or choose other free books by Fred Kofman to read onlineMoreLess
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